Marquette Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 2 Winter 1988

Article 6

Wisconsin Lenders Beware: Borrowers Are Striking
Back With Lender Liability
Timothy P. Reardon

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Timothy P. Reardon, Wisconsin Lenders Beware: Borrowers Are Striking Back With Lender Liability, 71 Marq. L. Rev. 376 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol71/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

WISCONSIN LENDERS BEWARE: BORROWERS
ARE STRIKING BACK WITH LENDER
LIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Metropolitan Bank is a profitable bank which specializes in commercial lending. One of its longstanding customers
is Plastic Plus, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation. It is owned and
operated by Danny Ongais. Plastic Plus' main business is the
manufacture and sale of high tech plastic automotive products. Prior to buying Plastic Plus with the help of Metropolitan Bank, Danny Ongais graduated from high school and
worked at a local gas station.
Since Danny is an auto mechanic, and not a financial wizard, he has relied heavily on Metropolitan Bank's financial advice. Danny readily acknowledges that this reliance has
contributed tremendously to Plastic Plus' success. Recently,
Metropolitan Bank recommended that Danny develop new
plastic components for cars and trucks which could be sold to
manufacturers and mechanics worldwide. To offset the cost
of developing and marketing a new product, Metropolitan
Bank volunteered to increase Plastic Plus' line of credit from
$200,000 to $3 million, at a very favorable interest rate, and
the parties executed a new security agreement which contained the following default provision:
12.3. Default in Current Ratio: In the event the Borrowers shall fail to maintain a current ratio of at least 2.0
and such default shall continue uncured for a period of
thirty days after the Bank gives the Borrowers written notice
of such deficiency, then the obligation of the Bank to make
loans and issue letters of credit shall terminate and the Bank,
at its option, may declare all amounts to be, and all amounts
shall become, immediately due and payable, together with
accrued interest. Presentment, demand, protest, notice of
acceleration, nonpayment and dishonor are expressly
waived.
Under the new security agreement, Danny borrowed approximately $2,800,000 on his line of credit. He used
$2,600,000 to develop a new product, the Plastic Plus Fully
Plastic Exhaust System. While Plastic Plus projects that initial
sales for the new product will be approximately $15 million
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annually, Metropolitan Bank is convinced that the product
will not sell. The outlays necessary to develop the product
have decreased Plastic Plus' current ratio to 1.8. As soon as
this occurred, Metropolitan Bank gave Plastic Plus written
notice that thirty days had now passed without any change in
the current ratio; Plastic Plus is technically in default under
the security agreement. Metropolitan Bank would like to use
this opportunity to call the loan because, due to "changes in
the financial market," it may earn substantially more on its
money elsewhere. However, before doing so, it turns to its
legal counsel for advice.
This hypothetical situation is typical of many lending relationships nationwide. Recently, courts have found that while
lenders may have been trying to protect legitimate legal rights
and business interests, their conduct has failed to meet standards of fair play. Lenders have been held liable for such
things as: negligently processing loan applications; negligently administering loans; failing to disclose accurate and
complete financial information to the borrower and his creditors; failing to advance money under discretionary lines of
credit; threatening to call loans or commence foreclosure actions based on technical non-compliance with the security
agreement; and exercising too much control over the borrower's business.
Wisconsin courts have not had the opportunity to address
many of these issues. First, this Comment gives an overview
of the common law lender liability theories of: agency;' fraudulent misrepresentation; 2 duress; 3 tortious interference with
business relations; 4 good faith and fair dealing;5 fiduciary duty
of disclosure;6 and negligent misrepresentation.7 Second, it
suggests, where applicable, how Wisconsin courts may decide
lender liability issues using the appropriate underlying common law theory. Finally, this Comment suggests several de-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

15-17 and accompanying text.
45-48 and accompanying text.
60-66 and accompanying text.
72-79 and accompanying text.
93-103 and 114-17 and accompanying text.
121-33 and accompanying text.
137-40 and accompanying text.
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fensive lending tactics which a Wisconsin lender and its legal
counsel may use to minimize lending risk.
II.

AGENCY

Under the common law theory of agency, lender liability is
premised upon the existence of a principal/agent relationship
between the lender and borrower. While few courts have
adopted agency principles as a means of finding lender liability,8 the Minnesota Supreme Court in A. Gay Jenson Farms
Co. v. Cargill,9 held that the lender, by its exercise of control
and influence over the borrower, became a principal with liability for the transactions entered into by its agent, the
borrower.
Jenson arose out of the financial collapse of a grain elevator operation, Warren Grain & Seed Co. (Warren).10 Warren's entire operation had been financed by Cargill, Inc.
(Cargill) for over fourteen years. 1 ' In return for financing
Warren, Cargill received a right of first refusal to purchase
grain from Warren, access to Warren's financial records and
the right to approve any capital improvements made by Warren in excess of $5,000.12 Further, Warren was prohibited
from guaranteeing debts, encumbering its assets, declaring a
dividend, and buying or selling stock without Cargill's consent. 13 As Warren's debt grew, Cargill monitored Warren on a
daily basis and initially promised several of Warren's creditors
that it would assure payment of their accounts. 14
The Jenson court defined agency as "the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
8. See, e.g., Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1946); In re
Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939); Buck v. NashFinch Co., 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960).
9. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). For a more extensive analysis of Jenson, see
Lundgren, Liability of a Creditorin a ControlRelationship with its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L.
REV. 523, 534-36 (1984).
10. Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 288.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 289.
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subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." 15
The court also required that an agreement, but not necessarily
a contract, must exist between the parties before an agency
relationship would be implied.16 Furthermore, in cases where
the existence of an agency relationship is not clear-cut, Jenson
held that circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the
requisite course of dealings between the parties.' 7 Thus, the
court concluded that an agency relationship resulted due to
the following facts: (1) Cargill's continuous directions and
recommendations to Warren constituted a manifestation of its
consent that Warren should be its agent; (2) Warren acted on
Cargill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill as part of its
normal operations which Cargill totally financed; and (3) Cargill's continuous interference with the internal affairs of Warren constituted de facto control. 8
Once an agency relationship has been established, a lender,
as a principal, may incur liability for the acts of the borrower,
as agent, when the lender assumes control of the borrower's
business.' 9 However, Buck v. Nash-Finch Co. 20 makes it evi15. Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 290 (citing Jurek v. Thompson, 308 Minn. 191, 194, 241
N.W.2d 788, 791 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958)). Note that
the fiduciary relationship used in an agency context differs from the fiduciary duty of
disclosure discussed in the text accompanying notes 121-25.
16. Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 290, construed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ I comment b (1958).
17. Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 290 (citing Rausch v. Aronson, 211 Minn. 272, 273, 1
N.W.2d 371, 372 (1941)). Factors of circumstantial evidence in Jenson which indicate
the lender's control and influence over the borrower include:
(1) Cargill's constant recommendations to Warren by telephone;
(2) Cargill's right of first refusal on grain;
(3) Warren's inability to enter into mortgages, to purchase stock or to pay
dividends without Cargill's approval;
(4) Cargill's right of entry onto Warren's premises to carry on periodic
checks and audits;
(5) Cargill's correspondence and criticism regarding Warren's finances, officers [sic] salaries and'inventory;
(6) Cargill's determination that Warren needed "strong paternal guidance";
(7) Provision of drafts and forms to Warren upon which Cargill's name was
imprinted;
(8) Financing of all Warren's purchases of grain and operating expenses; and
(9) Cargill's power to discontinue the financing of Warren's operations.
Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 291.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 (1958)). The Restatement (Second) of Agency notes that:
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dent that a lender must take absolute and total control of the
borrower's business to incur liability.
In Buck, the borrower, a grocery store owner, bought merchandise from the lender, a wholesaler.2" After a period of
time, and at the lender's insistence, one of its accountants became the bookkeeper for the borrower.22 Also at the lender's
suggestion, the borrower hired a manager who had been handpicked by the lender.2 3 The Supreme Court of South Dakota
held that while the lender exercised such control over the borrower's operations that neither cash nor merchandise could be
withdrawn from the business, the fact that the borrower controlled the store's buying operations at all times indicated that
the lender did not exercise such substantial control over the
borrower as to warrant imposing liability on the lender.24
In two earlier decisions, In re Prima Co.25 and Wasilowski
v. Park Bridge Corp.,26 which are factually similar to Jenson
and Buck, the Seventh and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals
also held that the respective lenders had not exerted undue
influence and control over the businesses of the borrowers.27
It is very difficult to reconcile the Buck, Prima, and Wasilowski decisions with the Jenson decision. The lenders exercised
similar degrees of control in all the cases 28 and both Buck and
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of
his debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not
thereby become a principal. However, if he takes over the management of the
debtor's business either in person or through an agent, and directs what con-

tracts may or may not be made, he becomes a principal, liable as any principal
for the obligations incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the
debtor who has now become his agent. The point at which the creditor becomes
a principal is that at which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his
general debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with his debtor may
be.
RESTFATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 comment a (1958).

20. 78 S.D. 334, 102 N.W.2d 84 (1960).
21. Id. at

22. Id.
23. Id. at,

-,

102 N.W.2d at 85.

102 N.W.2d at 86-88. Despite the management change, the store still

continued to lose money. Id.
24. Id. at -, 102 N.W.2d at 91.
25. 98 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 658 (1939). For a detailed
analysis of Prima, see Lundgren, supra note 9, at 525-27.
26. 156 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1946).
27. Wasilowski, 156 F.2d at 615; Prima, 98 F.2d at 966.
28. In Prima, one of the lending banks suggested that the borrower hire an outside
manager who had total control over the borrower's business, subject only to the control
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Jenson based the imposition of liability on section 140 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency. 29 Perhaps the decisions' differing results can only be explained by the fact that the Jenson
decision was handed down more than twenty years after
Buck, Prima, and Wasilowski, in an age when courts were
more receptive to finding lender liability.
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court defines the agency relationship in accord with the Jenson court,30 it never has applied it in the lending context. Since past cases in this area
indicate that a finding of liability is dependent upon the existence of factual elements of control which result in an agency
relationship, absent such factors, it is unlikely that the Wisconsin borrower would prevail under this theory. Thus, a
borrower would need to consider pursuing alternative theories
of liability.
III.

A.

COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY

Traditional Tort Theories Applied to Lender Liability

When lenders become dissatisfied with the financial performance of the borrower, they are quick to blame the decisions and policies of the borrower's management team for the
financial downfall. To rectify the borrower's loss in earning
potential, lenders often attempt to influence the decisions or
make-up of the borrower's board of directors or management
team by threatening to put the borrower in default under the
terms of the loan agreement and call the loan. The relatively
recent holding of the Texas Court of Appeals in State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,31 illustrates how
lender liability may arise under the traditional tort theories
of fraudulent misrepresentation, duress and tortious
interference.
of the two lending banks. Prima, 98 F.2d at 962-63. For a synopsis of the elements of
control in Buck, see supra text accompanying notes 21-24. For the elements of control

in Jenson, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
29. For the courts' analyses of section 14 0 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, see Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 291; Buck, 78 S.D. at -, 102 N.W.2d at 89-90.
30. Rule v. Jones, 256 Wis. 102, 110, 40 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1949); Sevey v. Jones,

235 Wis. 109, 111-12, 292 N.W. 436, 437-38 (1940); Georgeson v. Nielsen, 214 Wis.
191, 196, 252 N.W. 576, 578 (1934). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 1 (1958).
31. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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Farah Manufacturing Co. (FMC), an apparel manufacturer owned by the Farah family and run by William F.
Farah, became a public corporation in 1967.32 From 1972 to
1976, FMC suffered pre-tax losses of nearly $44 million, partially as a result of an extended strike.33 In July of 1976, the
FMC Board of Directors removed Farah as Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) and named Leone as CEO.34 On February 14,
1977, FMC and State National Bank of El Paso, Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago and
Republic National Bank Dallas N.A. (the "lenders") amended
a loan agreement to include a management change clause.
This clause provided that any change in management of FMC
considered adverse to the lenders' interests would constitute
an event of default and allow the lenders to accelerate the
loan.35 FMC continued to suffer losses. At the March 7,
1977, annual directors' meeting, Farah attempted to regain his
position as president and CEO. 36 Fearing that Farah's election would violate the terms of the management change
clause, the board sought the advice of the lenders. 3 The lenders considered all possible alternatives and advised the Board
of Directors that if Farah was elected president of the company, the lenders automatically would bankrupt FMC and
38
padlock it.
32. Id. at 667.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. The management change clause set forth in section 6.1(g) of the February
14, 1977 loan agreement made it an event of default if there occurred: "Any change in

the office of President and Chief Executive Officer of Farah [Manufacturing Company,
Inc.] or any other change in the executive management of Farah [Manufacturing Company, Inc.] which any two Banks shall consider, for any reason whatsoever, to be adverse to the interests of the Banks." Id.

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 673. The lenders met over a period of approximately ten days and considered the following alternatives before rendering a final decision:
1) stop the board meeting if the lenders do not want Farah in [office];
2) get a new board with probable lender indemnification if the lenders want
other management;
3) allow Farah to have the position for 30-60 days after which the loan will be
called;

4) make a public statement;
5) shrinking the board; and

6) go to New York to sell the company.
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Evidence introduced at trial indicated that the lenders
blocked the election of two directors they believed Farah
would be able to control. 39 Subsequently, the lenders succeeded in having three individuals, two of whom had some
association with at least one of the lenders, elected to the
Board of Directors. 4° There was no evidence that the board
members breached any fiduciary duty or that the lenders dominated the board members. On May 27, 1977, FMC hired
Galef as a financial consultant at the insistence of the lenders.
Two months later, the lenders waived the management change
41
clause to permit Galef to replace Conroy as CEO of FMC.
Under Galef, FMC sold valuable assets at auctions and used
the proceeds to make prepayments on FMC's loans. 42 There
was also evidence that the lenders pursued several potential
merger candidates for FMC, without FMC's knowledge.43
Eventually, the parties restructured the loan agreement,
Farah was re-elected CEO, and the company returned to profitability. However, by this time the lenders had committed
several tortious acts which resulted in a jury verdict of nearly
$19 million against the lenders. The Texas Court of Appeals
affirmed the award based on a finding that the lenders committed acts of fraudulent misrepresentation, duress and tortious interference. 44
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
While the specific elements of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation are governed by controlling state law, 45 actionId.
39. Id. at 674.
40. Id. at 675-76. The new Board members were Pulley, a long-time employee of
Republic who agreed to serve as a Board member if Republic indemnified him; Williams, a member of the Board of Directors of State National; and Jaynes, the only member considered to be independent of the lenders. Id.
41. Id. at 668. Galef was hired to consult for the fee of $1,000 per day. State
National opposed Galef's suggestion that Farah also be hired as a consultant. Id. at
677.
42. Id. at 678. The evidence indicated that the auction sales stripped FMC of
many valuable assets, a number of which were purchased by competitors and financed
by State National. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 680.
45. State law governs whether a suit may be maintained when a lender's misrepresentations are not in writing. See, e.g., Emery Corp. v. Century Bancorp., 588 F. Supp.
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able fraud generally consists of the following traditional
elements:
(1) [t]hat a material representation was made; (2) that it
was false; (3) that, when the speaker made it, he knew it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth
and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the party; (5) that the
party acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that he thereby sufis found
fered injury. The gist of an action based upon fraud
46
in the fraud of defendant and damage to plaintiff.
Additionally, some states require borrowers to prove that they
justifiably relied on the lender's fraudulent misrepresentation,
and thus, acted with due diligence.4 7 The borrower is required
to prove every element of fraudulent misrepresentation before
the borrower will be entitled to damages.4 8
In Farah, the court focused on the meaning of the word
"representation" in order to determine when failure to fully
inform a borrower constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation:
"A representation consists of words or other conduct manifesting to another the existence of a fact, including a state of
mind . . . . A misrepresentation is a representation which,
under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in ac-

15 (D. Mass. 1984). In Emery, the defendant made false statements concerning its customer's creditworthiness during a telephone conference call between Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania. While Pennsylvania law allowed for suit based on oral fraudulent misrepresentations, a Massachusetts' statute of frauds specifically prohibited actions based
on oral misrepresentations. Id. at 17.
46. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 681 (citing Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust,
516 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974)). See also Brayton Chem., Inc. v. First Farmers State
Bank, 671 F.2d 1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust,
713 S.W.2d 517, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Brown, 519 P.2d 491, 495 (Okla. 1974).
47. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d
771, 782 (7th Cir. 1985) (in which the court rejected defendant's argument that
GMAC's business practices were imprudent and caused GMAC's losses stating: "[Defendant] Bank's misrepresentations were deliberate, and GMAC's contributory negligence is not a defense to liability for an intentional tort."); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co.,
615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 1980) (in which the court defined due diligence as "incidental
to proof of justifiable reliance" rather than as a separate element of fraud, since fraud is
an intentional tort to which contributory negligence is not a defense).
48. See Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 539 (requires the pleader to establish every element by
substantial evidence); In re Belco, Inc., 38 Bankr. 525, 528 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984)
(requires the pleader to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence).
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cordance with the facts."'49 While a representation may literally be true, it is actionable if it is used to create an impression
which is substantially false.5 0 Section 527 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts states:
A representation that a maker knows to be capable of two
interpretations, one of which he knows to be false and the
other true is fraudulent if it is made:
(a) with the intention that it be understood in the sense
in which it is false, or
(b) without any belief or expectation as to how it will be
understood, or
(c) with reckless indifference as to how it will be
understood.-"
In Farah, the lenders, through a letter written by their counsel, made a fraudulent misrepresentation by voluntarily conveying false or misleading information which was capable of
two interpretations and which was wrongfully designed to influence Farah and the other members of the Board of Directors.5 Where lenders convey false information to borrowers
or deliberately suppress material
facts, their failure to disclose
3
the falsity constitutes fraud.
In a situation where the lender argues that it had no
knowledge of falsity at the time it made the questionable representations to the borrower, courts will infer the requisite
knowledge of falsity from the surrounding circumstances. 4
49. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 680-81 (quoting Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank &
Trust, 516 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Tex. 1974)).
50. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 681 (citing Blanton v. Sherman Compress Co., 256
S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953)).
51. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 681 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 527
(1977)).
52. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 681.
53. Id. See Aaron Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 123
(2d Cir. 1984) (where the court stated: "a duty to disclose may arise in two situations:
first where the parties enjoy a fiduciary relationship, and second, where one party possesses superior knowledge, not readily available to the other, and knows that the other is
acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.") (citations omitted); Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 582 F. Supp. 1436, 1442-43 (W.D. Pa. 1984). See generally Nicewander, FinancialRecord Privacy - What Are and What Should Be the Rights
of the Customer of a Depository Institution, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 601, 621-23 (1985),
54. See, e.g., Brayton Chem., Inc. v. First Farmers State Bank, 671 F.2d 1047,
1048-49 (7th Cir. 1982) (knowledge inferred based on the fact that the bank continually
transacted business with the subject of the inquiry); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 131 11. App. 3d 977, 981, 476 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1985).
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In Farah, for example, State National Bank argued that fraud
does not arise from a misrepresentation of future action unless
the future act would have been beneficial to the promisee and
the promisor's nonperformance injured the promisee. 5 However, the court used the surrounding circumstances of the
March 22, 1977 letter to FMC, the oral representations of
State National Bank and its attorney, and Farah's justifiable
reliance on their representations to establish the lender's
fraudulent intent.16 Hence, actionable fraud may result from
a present misrepresentation even though the lender has actual
control over its occurrence or existence in the future.
While Wisconsin courts have yet to address the issue of
fraudulent misrepresentation in the lending context, the Wisconsin fraudulent misrepresentation standard appears to be
similar to that set forth in Farah. Currently, the party alleging fraud must prove by clear and convincing evidence5 7 that:
(1) the fraudulent misrepresentation contained an untrue
statement of fact or that the party accused of fraud made the
statement with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity;58 (2)
the party accused of fraud made the fraudulent misrepresentation with the intent to defraud and for the purpose of inducing
the other party to act upon it; and (3) that the party alleging
fraud detrimentally relied upon the fraudulent misrepresentation.5 9 Although the Wisconsin court is mute as to whether
the misrepresentation in question must be material, one might
assume that materiality will be required since the court requires the plaintiff to show damages or injuries.
55. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 682.

56. Id. at 681-82. The court further stated that "[w]here a promise regarding future action is made with the intent that it will not be performed and is made to deceive a
person, then it is actionable as a fraudulent misrepresentation." Id. at 682 (citations

omitted).
57. First Nat'l Bank v. Scieszinski, 25 Wis. 2d 569, 572, 131 N.W.2d 308, 310
(1964) (citing Neas v. Siemens, 10 Wis. 2d 47, 53, 102 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1960)); Household Fin. Corp. v. Christian, 8 Wis. 2d 53, 55, 98 N.W.2d 390, 392 (1959); Larson v.

Splett, 267 Wis. 473, 475, 66 N.W.2d 181, 182 (1954).
58. Stevenson v. Barwineck, 8 Wis. 2d 557, 562, 99 N.W.2d 690, 693 (1959).
59. First Natl Bank, 25 Wis. 2d at 573, 131 N.W.2d at 310 (quoting Household

Fin., 8 Wis. 2d at 55-56, 98 N.W.2d at 392); W.H. Hobbs Supply Co. v. Ernst, 270 Wis.
166, 169, 70 N.W.2d 615, 617 (1955); Larson, 267 Wis. at 475, 66 N.W.2d at 182.
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2. Duress
Duress is the second common law theory of liability relied
upon by the Texas Court of Appeals in Farah. The elements
of common law duress generally include:
(1) a threat to do some act which the threatening party has
no legal right to do;
(2) a threat which is of such a character as to cause the
threatened party to do that which he would not otherwise do and which he is not legally bound to do;
(3) the restraint caused by such threat must be imminent;
and
(4) the person at whom the threat is directed has no present
means of protection.6°
A plaintiff must establish all of the aforementioned elements
to recover for duress. Thus, there is no basis for a claim of
duress when the threatening party has a legal right to do that
which he threatens. 61 In other words, common law duress is
dependent upon the threatening party's use of either extortive
measures or improper demands which demonstrate a lack of
good faith by the threatening party.62
60. See Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 684. Further elements which are available to the
threatening party in the enforcement of its legal rights include:
[5] Where a demand made is wrongful or unlawful, and it is necessary for the
party making such demand to resort to the courts to enforce same, there is no
duress, for the one upon whom demand is made has adequate means of protection, and there is no imminent restraint....
[6] But where the party making such demand has, or is supposed to have, the
power to injure the business or property interests of the one upon whom such
demand is made, without resort to the courts to enforce the demand, and threatens to do an act which would cause such injury, and which he has no right to do,
and thereby induces a compliance with his demand,
[7] against the will of such party through fear of injury to his business or property interests, such threats amount to duress,
[8] if it appears that the party making such demand and threat ought not in
good conscience to retain the benefit received by reason thereof.
Id.
61. Id. See Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv., 80 N.M. 680, -, 459 P.2d 842,
845 (1969) (citing Avallone v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 344 Mass. 556, 183 N.E.2d
496 (1962); Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., 9 Wis. 2d 487, 101 N.W.2d 805 (1960)).
62. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 684 (citing Sanders v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 389 S.W.2d
551, 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)). Duress is dependent on the motive upon which a
claim is based. According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1981):
(1) A threat is improper if...
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract with the recipient.
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Economic duress, sometimes referred to as business compulsion,63 differs somewhat from common law duress. It
arises when the threatening party "forces its victim to choose
between distasteful and costly situations," such as undergoing
bankruptcy, losing one's credit rating or suffering a loss of
profits because of loan restrictions.' In determining whether
the lender acted with a proper motive and purpose in subjecting the borrower to choose between such adverse alternatives,
courts consider all the facts and circumstances in order to
make a reasonable inference of the lender's intent.15 When
duress is exerted under circumstances sufficient to influence
the apprehensions and conduct of a prudent businessman, the
borrower is not bound by the resulting agreement.66
The economic duress claim in Farah focused on the lenders' threats to bankrupt FMC and padlock its doors if Farah
became involved in the management of the company. These
threats gave Farah and others the impression that the only
way to save FMC was to accede to the lenders' demand that
Farah not be reelected as CEO. 67 The court concluded that,
as a matter of law, FMC established a cause of action for economic duress.
3.

Tortious Interference

The third theory of common law lender liability relied on
by the Texas Court of Appeals in Farah is that of tortious
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party making the threat ... or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.

Id.
63. Pecos, 80 N.M. at -, 459 P.2d at 845 (quoting Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593,
89 P.2d 513 (1939)). See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 6 (1966).
64. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 686 (citing 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1617 (3d ed.

1970)). See also Pecos, 80 N.M. at __,459 P.2d at 845; Housing Auth. v. Hubbell, 325
S.W.2d 880, 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1959).
65. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 297 (Alaska 1983) (considering all the facts and circumstances, the court found the bank was not acting "honestly
in fact" and was specifically acting for the purpose of setting an example and putting
plaintiffs under duress to coerce them to agree to terms to which the plaintiffs were not
obligated to agree); Pecos, 80 N.M. at -, 459 P.2d at 845.

66. Pecos, 80 N.M. at -, 459 P.2d at 845 (citing King Constr. Co. v. W.M. Smith
Elec., 350 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961)).
67. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 673-74.
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interference with business relations.68 This claim centered
around the lenders' willful and intentional interference with
FMC's right to lawful management through the selection of a
handpicked CEO and board members and the forcing of
Farah's resignation. 69 Additionally, the fact that the lenders
encouraged and financially supported costly litigation and a
proxy fight against Farah when he sought to restore lawful
management to the company indicated interference. 70 The
court found that the lenders interfered with FMC's business
relationships through the election of incompetent, inexperienced directors and officers with divided loyalty.71
In order to maintain a cause of action for interference with
another's business relations, the plaintiff must establish that:
(1) there was a contract subject to interference;
(2) the act of interference was willful and intentional;
(3) such intentional act was a proximate cause of
[p]laintiff's damage; and
72
(4) actual damage or loss occurred.
Proof of these elements will establish a prima facie case of
interference; the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant
who is required to show the justification or privilege for the
acts.73
Usually, once interference with another's business relations has been established, it "is actionable only if the interference is motivated by malice and no useful purpose of the
inducing party is subserved. ' ' 74 Davis v. Lewis 75 defines malice
in a legal sense, not in its proper sense of ill will against a
person, as characterizing an unlawful act done intentionally
without just cause or excuse. 76 Therefore, since malice constitutes an intentional and unlawful interference, a plaintiff need
not prove the defendant acted with ill will to establish a cause
68. Id. at 688.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 690.
72. Pace v. Garcia, 631 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (citing Armendariz
v. Mora, 553 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)).
73. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 689.
74. Pace, 631 F. Supp. at 1419-20 (citing Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 688).
75. 487 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
76. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 688 (citing Davis, 487 S.W.2d at 414). See generally
Light v. Transport Ins. Co., 469 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:376

of action to recover actual damages based on the tort of
interference.77
A defendant may lawfully interfere with another's business relations if it has an economic interest, uses only fair
means (accompanied by honest intent) and acts only to better
its own business and not principally to harm the other.78 Interference is wrongful only "[i]f [the] acts complained of do
not rest on some legitimate interest or if there is sharp dealing
or overreaching or other conduct below the behavior of fair
[business persons] similarly situated . .

. ."9

While the courts

often allow interference with another's business relations, 80
the Farah court held that a "justifiable business interest does
not grant [an] absolute privilege to interfere with a contractual
relationship between others."8
In Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. General Motors, 82 the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that various factors which
relate to the private interests of the parties involved, as well as
to the social utility of these interests, must be weighed. 83 It

stated: "The principal issue thus becomes whether the social
benefits derived in permitting acts of intervention outweigh
the harm to be expected therefrom." 84 For instance, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Del State Bank v. Salmon, 85 de-

spite evidence that the bank intentionally interfered in terminating the borrower's employment, held that the bank had the
privilege to interfere in the affairs of the borrower because of
the bank's status as a substantial creditor of the borrower's
employer and because the bank intended its actions to benefit
its financial position, and not wrongfully harm the borrower.86
77. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 689. Actual malice which may be defined as ill will, spite,
evil motive, or purposing the injury of another, need not exist. Id. See Del State Bank
v. Salmon, 548 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Okla. 1976); Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822
(Tex. 1969); Herider Farms-El Paso, Inc. v. Criswell, 519 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1975).
78. Del State Bank, 548 P.2d at 1027.
79. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 689 (citing Light, 469 S.W.2d at 439). See Leonard
Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
81. Farah, 578 S.W.2d at 689.
82. 488 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 206.
84. Id.
85. 548 P.2d 1024.
86. Id. at 1027.
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B.

Good Faith and FairDealing

Despite the application of traditional tort theories in the
lending context, the leading common law theory of lender liability is that of good faith and fair dealing. 87 In the usual loan
process, the bank and the borrower enter into an agreement
stating that the bank will lend a certain amount, at a certain
rate, for a certain period of time. The Uniform Commercial
Code protects the parties by imposing an obligation of good
faith in the performance and enforcement of the security
agreement. 88 Recently, courts have applied the good faith obligation to all stages of the lender/borrower relationship.89
1. Refusal to Advance Funds
In K.MC. Co. v. Irving Trust,90 a jury awarded the plaintiff $7.5 million in damages caused by the lender's failure to
act in good faith in refusing to make further advances under a
discretionary line of credit. 91 K.M.C., a wholesale and retail
grocery business, entered into a financing agreement with Irving Trust Company (Irving) whereby Irving held a security
interest in all of K.M.C.'s accounts receivable and inventory. 92
In return, Irving extended K.M.C. a $3 million line of credit
in 1979 which was increased to $3.5 million one year later. 93
Then, on March 1, 1982, K.M.C. requested $800,000 from the
bank and Irving refused, notwithstanding the fact that the
new funding would still have left the company's total borrowing below the $3.5 million approved line of credit. 94 K.M.C.
collapsed and sued Irving, arguing that Irving's refusal without prior notice to advance the requested funds breached its
87. The terms "good faith" and "fair dealing" are actually interchangeable. See
Swartz, Lender Liability, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at 10, 14.
88. See generally U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977).
89. See infra notes 90-119. See, e.g., Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Mun. Leasing, 716
F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983) (the court found a letter between a lender and borrower to be a
binding commitment to lend which required the parties to negotiate the terms of the

loan in good faith); Cohen v. Ratinoff, 147 Cal. App. 3d 321, 195 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1983)
(the court implied the covenant of good faith to a lender exercising its rights under a
commercial lease). See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
90. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 755.
92. Id. at 754.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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duty of good faith performance implied in the security agreement between the two parties.95 Irving argued that it had full
discretion to decide whether or not to make advances under
the loan agreement; it also argued that the loan, as a demand
loan, could have been called at any time. 96 The court found
that Irving had a duty to exercise good faith in deciding
whether to demand repayment of the loan or in refusing to
97
make further advances.
"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." 98 In determining whether a lender's
discretion not to advance additional funds falls within the
good faith limitation, "the Uniform Commercial Code and the
courts have imposed limitations of reasonableness and fairness." 99 Hence, the court in KMC. concluded that "there
must at least be some objective basis upon which a reasonable
loan officer in the exercise of his discretion" would have acted
in making the decision not to advance funds. 1°°
Notice is a key element in determining whether the lender
made the refusal to advance funds in good faith and in the
reasonable exercise of the lender's discretion.10 1 To impose a
good faith duty of notification, a security agreement must ex95. Id.
96. Id. at 759.
97. Id. at 754-60.
98. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977). See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance & CommercialReasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666,
668 (1963).
99. KMC., 757 F.2d at 760. See also Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d
1367, 1375 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228, 236 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1986). U.C.C. § 1-208 (1977) provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or
"when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised.
Id.
100. K.MC., 757 F.2d at 761 (emphasis in original). See infra text accompanying
note 117.
101. Id., at 759. See Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N.Y. 642, 645, 29 N.E. 142, 143
(1891): "[I]f a notice was requisite to its proper execution, a covenant to give such
notice will be inferred, for any other construction would make the contract unreasonable, and place one of the parties entirely at the mercy of the other." Id. (citations
omitted).
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ist between the parties.'
The Uniform Commercial Code
states that "the application of principles of good faith and
sound commercial practice normally call for such notification
of the termination of a going contract relationship as will give
the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute arrangement."'' 0 3 Thus, the fact that Irving refused to advance funds
without prior notice to K.M.C. constitutes an act of bad faith,
as well as an abuse of discretion which gives rise to liability.104
In In re Red Cedar Construction Co.,105 the court makes it
evident that the lender does not have a good faith duty to notify the borrower when an agreement between the parties is
revocable. 10 6 Furthermore, the lender does not have a good
faith duty to notify the borrower that it will not advance funds
when the lender reasonably believes that the borrower is either
not capable of making payment or performing or otherwise
falls outside the lender's eligibility guidelines. 10 7 Thus,
whether a lender must act on a good faith basis in refusing to
advance funds depends on the type of security agreement that
governs the lending relationship of the parties.
Recently, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals defined good
faith to mean "an honest intention to abstain from taking unfair advantage of another, through technicalities of law, by
failure to provide information or to give notice, or by other
activities which render the transaction unfair."'' 08 The court
qualified the definition by stating that the failure of a lender to
give notice is not determinative; the "touchstone of good faith
is honesty in fact and reasonableness."'' 0 9 If upheld, this decision appears to give the Wisconsin lender the latitude to refuse
102.
103.
104.
K.M.C.
at 763.
105.
106.

Red Cedar, 63 Bankr. at 237. See supra note 89.
K.M.C. 757 F.2d at 759 (citing U.C.C. § 2-309 comment 8 (1977)).
KM.
C, 757 F.2d at 759. The court stated in dicta that "[fif
Irving had given
30 days, 7 days, even 48 hours notice," it would have been a different case. Id.
63 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986).
Id. at 237-38 & n.7.

107. Id. at 238. The court based this conclusion on the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals holding in K.M.C that an "obligation to act in good faith would require a
period of notice to K.M.C. to allow a reasonable opportunity to seek alternative financ-

ing, absent valid business reason precluding Irving from doing so." Id. at 236 (citing
K.M.C, 757 F.2d at 760-63) (emphasis added).

108. Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 131 Wis. 2d 389, 402, 388 N.W.2d 645, 651
(Ct. App. 1986).
109. Id. at 403, 388 N.W.2d at 651.
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to advance additional funds without prior notice. Thus, the
key to avoiding liability in Wisconsin under the good faith
standard is to act honestly and reasonably.
2.

Acceleration of Maturity

In Brown v. AVEMCO Investment Corp.,110 the security
agreement between the lender and borrower gave the lender
the right to accelerate, at its option, full payment of the
loan."1 ' Because the borrower violated a provision in the security agreement which prohibited it from leasing an airplane
used as collateral to a third party, the lender attempted to use
this violation of the security agreement to put the borrower in
default two years after the lease between the borrower and the
lessee was entered into.112 The Brown court found that the
lender's act of taking advantage of a technical default constituted bad faith.' 13
Acceleration clauses, while designed to protect the lender
from actions of the borrower which jeopardize or impair the
lender's security, are not to be used for the commercial advantage of the creditor.114 Courts and the Uniform Commercial
Code utilize the reasonableness and fairness test in determining whether questionable acceleration resulted from a good
faith belief of security impairment. 1 5 In Blaine v.
G.M.
A.C.,16 the court held that acceleration is permissible
when the lender falls within the "dual elements of whether (1)
a reasonable [person] would have accelerated the debt under
the circumstances, and (2) whether the creditor acted in good
faith." 1 7 For example, when the course of dealing between
the parties reveals that the borrower historically pays late and
the lender continually accepts payments without complaint, it
would be unreasonable for the lender to accelerate payment of
the debt the next time the borrower misses a specified pay110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1379-80.
Id. at 1376.
See supra note 99.
82 Misc. 2d 653, 370 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1975).
Id. at 655, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
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ment date. 18 Thus, the good faith standard used for permissible acceleration is very similar to the good faith standard to
which a lender must adhere in refusing to advance additional
funds. 119
C. Additional Common Law Theories of Lender Liability
1. Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure
The facts of a California Circuit Court case, Kruse/Jewell
v. Bank of America,12 0 demonstrate the theory of fiduciary
duty of disclosure. The borrower, Jewell, an unsophisticated
apple farmer, had a longstanding business relationship with
the Bank of America. One of Jewell's processors, the
O'Connell Company, had serious financial problems. Jewell
borrowed money from the Bank of America, lent it to the
O'Connell Company (also a customer of the Bank of
America), who in turn paid off a default judgment obtained by
Taylor-Doyle, Inc. Taylor-Doyle, also controlled by the Bank
of America, used the money which the O'Connell Company
borrowed from Jewell to repay its delinquent loans to the
Bank. The jury found the Bank of America committed a
breach of fiduciary duty by failing to disclose its interest in the
transaction to Jewell and awarded Jewell nearly $46 million in
compensatory and punitive damages which the trial judge reduced to $27 million.
A fiduciary relationship is a "confidential trust relationship [which] arises when one party justifiably reposes confidence in another."' 2'
There are two types of fiduciary
118. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983), where the
court found that the lender's action in taking possession of the collateral resulted in a
breach of the lender's obligation of good faith where the bank's course of conduct in
accepting late payments resulted in a waiver of its right to accelerate the loan without
notice to the borrower.
119. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
120. No. 112438, slip op. (Superior Ct. Sonoma County, CA 1985).
121. Williams v. Bums, 540 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (D. Colo. 1982) (citing Page v.
Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 316, 592 P.2d 792, 798 (1979)). See Liebergesell v. Evans, 93
Wash. 2d 881, -_,
613 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1980); Moon v. Phipps, 67 Wash. 2d 948, 954,
411 P.2d 157, 160-61 (1966). The Restatement of Contracts describes a fiduciary relationship as one in which one party "occupies such a relation to the other party as to
justify the latter in expecting that his interests will be cared for ....
" RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 472(1)(c) (1932).
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relationships. 1 2 2 A fiduciary relationship in law exists between
two parties by the simple fact that the nature of the relationship is one which historically has been considered to be fiduciary in character. 2 3 In law relationships include relationships
between a trustee and beneficiary, a principal and agent, a
husband and wife, a physician and patient, and an attorney
and client.' 24 A fiduciary relationship in fact exists where one
party justifiably expects the other party to care for the party's
welfare. 125
Historically, courts have failed to find the existence of a
fiduciary relationship in fact between a lender and borrower. 126 However, when special circumstances do result in
the development of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between a lender and its borrower, the lender has a duty to dis127
close material facts when dealing with the borrower.
Circumstances which indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship in fact-and thus impose a duty of disclosure upon
the lender-include: the nature and length of the relationship
of the parties; the relative sophistication of the borrower with
regard to financial and business matters; and the lender's
awareness that the borrower relied upon it to look after the
borrower's interests. 128
122. Liebergesell, 93 Wash. 2d at -, 613 P.2d at 1176 (citing Salter v. Heiser, 36
Wash. 2d 536, 550-55, 219 P.2d 574 (1950)).
123. Liebergesell, 93 Wash. 2d at _, 613 P.2d at 1176 (citing McCutcheon v.
Brownfield, 2 Wash. App. 348, 356-57, 467 P.2d 868, 874 (1970)).
124. Liebergesell, 93 Wash. 2d at -, 613 P.2d at 1176.
125. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 472 comment c (1932)).
126. See Aaron Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 123
(1984) (no fiduciary duty arose despite the finding that the lender concealed material
facts from the borrower); Klatt v. First State Bank, 206 Iowa 252, 220 N.W. 318 (1928)
(a claim of a confidential relationship between the bank and the customer is not sufficient to impose a fiduciary duty); Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196
N.W.2d 619 (1972) ( a bank ordinarily has no special duty to counsel and inform the
customer of every material fact relating to the transaction).
127. Aaron Ferer, 731 F.2d at 123. See generally Brasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 232
Ala. 340, 168 So. 42 (1936); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101
(1937) (where the bank acted as the customer's financial advisor for 23 years and induced him to give a mortgage by use of fraudulent means, the bank incurred a fiduciary
duty of disclosure); First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970); Burien
Motors, Inc. v. Balch, 9 Wash. App. 573, 513 P.2d 582 (1973) (an independent contractor, such as a bank, business advisor or broker, may assume a duty to disclose material
facts when involved in a relationship of trust and confidence with another).
128. See supra text accompanying note 120. In Kruse/Jewell the jury was
instructed:
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The Kruse/Jewell court found an in fact relationship. For
instance, the fact that George M. Jewell had only a high
school education, lacked sophistication in financial matters,
and readily relied on his friend and banker, William Sullivan,
led the jury to conclude that Bank of America had a fiduciary
relationship with Jewell.
A lender has a duty to disclose known facts when it is involved in a fiduciary or confidential relationship with the borrower. 12 9 Failure to make such disclosure constitutes a breach
of fiduciary duty. 131 In Everman National Bank v. United
States,'3 ' the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that the rule of materiality limits a lender's duty
to disclose knowledge which may be of interest to the borrower. 132 The court defined materiality as whether the prudent and reasonable banker would have reason to know that
the borrower would regard as important the information possessed by the lender. 33 Therefore, when the lender and borrower develop a fiduciary relationship, the prudent and
reasonable banker has a duty of disclosure, unless such information is either irrelevant or trivial.
2.

Negligent Misrepresentation

While all courts generally impose liability on lenders who
make fraudulent misrepresentations to borrowers, 131 only a
few courts have imposed lender liability using a theory of negligent misrepresentation. The apparent reason courts use a
Under ordinary circumstances the relationship between a bank and its customer is not a fiduciary one. Before a bank can be charged with a fiduciary
obligation to its customer, the bank must act on behalf of, and for the benefit of
its customer, or the parties must enter into a relationship which imposes that
understanding as a matter of law.
Considerations for the establishment of a fiduciary duty are:
1. the nature and length of the relationship
2.

discussions between the parties, and

3. the relative sophistication of the parties with regard to financial and business affairs.
Cal. Civ. Jury Instructions § 8306 (1986).
129. Kruse/Jewell, No. 112439, slip op. (Superior Ct. Sonoma County, CA 1986).
130. Id.
131. 756 F.2d 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 869.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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narrower standard of liability in negligent misrepresentation
actions is that the fault of the maker of a misrepresentation is
sufficiently less where it does not intentionally deceive the borrower, but only fails to exercise reasonable care in making the
good faith representation.135
In FirstNationalBank v. Collins, 3 6 the Colorado Court of
Appeals adopted the rationale of section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets forth the following elements necessary to state a claim for relief in negligent
misrepresentation:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) ...[T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons
for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply
it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he
intends the information to influence or knows that the
recipient so37 intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.1

This section of the Restatement clearly limits the liability
which may be incurred by a lender to a " 'fixed, definable and
contemplated' class of plaintiffs who the defendant has special
reason to anticipate will rely on the statement."' 138 Once a

borrower has established the prima facie elements of negligent
misrepresentation, the borrower has a cause of action only if it
can establish both that it justifiably relied on the negligently

135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
136. 616 P.2d 154 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
137. Id. at 155 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977)).
138. Note, Confirming Bank Liability in Letter of Credit Transactions: Whose
Bank is it Anyway?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1219, 1247 (1983) (citations omitted).
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supplied information and that the lender's 13negligent
misrep9
resentations proximately caused its injuries.
To incur liability in Wisconsin using the theory of negligent misrepresentation, the maker of the representation must
honestly believe in the truth of its statement, but fail to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the facts, or lack the skill
and competence required by a particular business or profession.1 40 Given this standard of liability, it would be entirely
reasonable for Wisconsin courts to extend this theory to the
lending context in the future. In determining whether the
lender either failed to exercise reasonable care or lacked the
requisite skill and competence, courts probably will consider
what a reasonable and prudent lender would have done, given
a like situation.
IV.

DEFENSIVE LENDING TACTICS FOR
WISCONSIN LENDERS

Unless the Wisconsin lender strictly adheres to the laws
governing lending practices, juries probably will be asked to
decide cases in which Wisconsin business managers and their
employees have had their livelihoods destroyed by the unrelenting foreclosure actions of insensitive, arrogant lenders.
Because juries nationwide will most likely continue to side
with the borrower 14 1 and continue to impose large punitive
damage awards, 142 what may the Wisconsin lender do to help
minimize its lending risks? Quite simply, lenders should treat
borrowers fairly and reasonably in all stages of the lending

139. Instituto Nacional v. Continental Ill. Natl Bank & Trust Co., 530 F. Supp.
279, 284 (N.D. Ill. 1982); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 363, 372 N.E.2d 315, 319,
401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 478 (1977); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174

N.E. 441, 444 (1931); Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388,
(1980).

-,

265 S.E.2d 617, 623

140. Stevenson v. Barwineck, 8 Wvis. 2d 557, 564, 99 N.W.2d 690, 694 (1959).
141. Cappello, Banking Malpractice?,U.S. BANKER, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 3, 6.

142. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (a $7.5
million jury award that included punitive damages was upheld); Alaska Statebank v.
Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983) (jury award of $35,000 in punitive damages was
upheld in this case involving a $50,000 promissory note); Kruse/Jewell v. Bank of
America, No. 112438, slip op. (Superior Ct. Sonoma County, CA 1986) (jury awarded
$27 million in punitive damages which the trial judge reduced to $6 million).
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relationship. 143 The following factors should be taken into
consideration in making efforts to curb lender liability.
A.

Documentation

When a borrower's business falters, lenders immediately
look to the default provisions of the security agreement. More
often than not, the default provision of a security agreement
contains an insecurity clause similar to that found in Brown v.
AVEMCO Investment Corp.,'" which states: "[I]f for any
reason Secured Party may deem itself insecure, then the whole
principal sum unpaid upon said promissory note... shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Secured
Party." 145 Brown indicates that a lender should not accelerate
a demand note upon a technical default of a security agreement's provision unless the lender, acting in good faith, believes that the prospects for payment or performance are
impaired.1 46 At the same time, other courts have held that
demand instruments
do not by their nature impose a good
47
faith standard.
Since courts are undecided as to whether a lender must use
a good faith standard in accelerating payment on a demand
note, lenders are well advised to act conservatively by accelerating payment only in good faith. To avoid the issue raised by
Brown, the lender could specify at the time the security agreement is negotiated which events of default are to be considered material enough to constitute default. 148 However, this
creates another problem in that anything not specifically listed
in the security agreement as material is not considered materially sufficient to put the borrower in default.149
143. See Cappello, supra note 141, at 7.
144. 603 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1979). See Alaska Statebank, 674 P.2d at 289.
145. Brown, 603 F.2d at 1369 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 1378. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. See also K.MC.,
757 F.2d at 759; In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228, 237-38 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1986).
147. Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys. Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Centerre Bank v. Distributors Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985).
148. Flick & Replansky, Trends in the Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections,A.L.I.-A.B.A. RESOURCE MATERIALS: BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW 399, 430 (1985).
149. Id.
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Where a technical default, such as late payment, occurs
and the good faith lender decides not to put the borrower in
default, the lender may have waived its right under the terms
of the security agreement to receive timely payments in the
future. 150 In such a situation, courts are divided as to whether
repossession of the collateral or acceleration of payment without first giving notice to the borrower constitutes a violation
of good faith and fair dealing by the lender.'5 1 The lender
may minimize the risk of incurring liability by doing two
things. First, the security agreement should contain a waiver
clause which ensures that the acceptance of late payments
does not constitute a modification or waiver of either the borrower's duty to make timely payments or the lender's right to
repossess the collateral or accelerate payment without giving
notice.152 Secondly, upon accepting a late payment from the
borrower, the lender should send notices to the borrower informing it that late payments constitute an event of default
under the terms of the security agreement and that the
lender's acceptance of such payment
does not result in a
1 53
loan.
the
call
to
right
its
of
waiver
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. 5 4 makes it evident
that a lender should never accelerate a demand instrument
without first giving the borrower written notice of default, unless it is able to show that such a delay in acceleration will
result in a material deterioration of the lender's position."'
While the period of notice which the lender must give the borrower depends on the terms of the given security agreement
clause, K.M.C. suggests that even after expiration of the specified notice period, acceleration of the loan may still be improper if the borrower has not been given sufficient time to
either complete a contemplated sale of assets or to arrange for
alternative financing.'B 6 Therefore, despite the explicit right
150. See, e.g., Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 293 (the course of dealings
between the parties and the lender's continued acceptance of the delayed payments resulted in a modification of the express terms of the loan agreement).
151. Id. at 292-93; Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 121 (Ind. 1981).
152. Flick & Replansky, supra note 148, at 428. But see Smith v. General Fin.
Corp., 243 Ga. 500, 255 S.E.2d 14 (1979).
153. Flick & Replansky, supra note 148, at 429.
154. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
155. K.M.C.., 757 F.2d at 759; In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228 at 238.
156. K.M. C., 757 F.2d at 763 n. 13. See Flick & Replansky, supra note 148, at 426.
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to accelerate set forth in the security agreement, the cautious
lender will allow the borrower a reasonable amount of time
after the notice of acceleration has been given.
Another common security agreement provision which
tends to give lenders headaches is a "Change in Management"
clause. While State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing
Co. 157 does not prohibit a lender from including a "Change in
Management" clause in the security agreement, 158 it makes it
evident that improper use of such a clause could result in substantial damages. 159 A "Change in Management" clause
should only be included where the lender reasonably believes
that certain individual directors and officers of the borrower
are important enough to the borrower's financial condition
that1 60it would not lend the money absent their managerial ability.
In these cases, the "Change in Management" clause
should specifically name the individual directors and officers
involved. Even though the borrower consents to the inclusion
of this clause, lenders should not use it to influence the election of individuals to the Board of Directors who are likely to
serve the interests of the lender, rather than those of the shareholders.161 Additionally, lenders should not threaten to call
the borrower's line of credit for the purpose of either compelling a change in management or forcing the borrower to act
62
otherwise for the lender's benefit.1
Finally, because most of the cases in which borrowers are
successful against lenders have been tried before sympathetic
juries, the lender should consider including a clause in the security agreement which waives each party's right to a jury
trial in the event of litigation. 163 When including such a
157. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). See supra text accompanying notes 3144.
158. Id. at 667. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, N.A., 679 F.2d 242,
246 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (conditioning the extension of additional credit on the appointment

by the bank of a business manager did not violate the Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments).
159. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 667.
160. Flick & Replansky, supra note 148, at 417.
161. Farah,678 S.W.2d at 668. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. A bank
should avoid having its employees, officers or directors serve on a borrower's Board of
Directors. Flick & Replansky, supra note 148, at 421.
162. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 673-74.
163. Flick & Replansky, supra note 148, at 448.
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clause in a security agreement, lenders must be sure that the
borrower is knowingly and voluntarily waiving this right.'64
B.

Counseling

When the profitability of a borrower begins to deteriorate,
lenders should not impose conditions or requirements on the
borrower which are not contained in the security agreement.
While courts usually allow lenders to give the borrower advice
if it is requested, the lender should never threaten default on
the borrower due to the borrower's failure to follow the
lender's advice. 165 If the lender desires some control over the
borrower's destiny it may reserve a veto power over select financial activities of the borrower in the security agreement,
but it should not obtain a veto66power over all proposed business activity of the borrower.1
The lending relationship becomes particularly precarious
when the lender suggests that the borrower hire an outside
consultant. Courts will allow lenders to recommend that a
consultant be hired, but the lender is not to choose the consultant.1 67 Furthermore, the lender should not interfere with
the employment contracts of its borrower, even if it does so
with the honest intent of protecting its own business while not
harming that of its borrower.1 68 In short, the lender should
could lead to a finding that it is in
avoid taking action which
169
control of the borrower.
164. Cases in which the validity of a contractual waiver of a jury trial has been in
issue have overwhelmingly applied the knowing and voluntary standard. See, e.g.,
KM.C., 757 F.2d at 756; National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1977); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.
Colo. 1982); Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
165. Moss, Defensive Lending, 73 A.B.A. J. 72 (March 1987). See A. Gay Jenson
Farms Co. v. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d 285, 290-91 (Minn. 1981); Buck v. Nash-Finch Co.
78 S.D. 334, -, 102 N.W.2d 84, 86 (1960); Farah,678 S.W.2d at 688.
166. Lundgren, supra note 9, at 539. See also Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chem., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973); Credit Managers Assn. v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 352, 124 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1975).
167. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242, 244 (1lth Cir. 1982); In
re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1938); Buck, 78 S.D. at _ 102 N.W.2d at 86;
Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 676.
168. Del State Bank v. Salmon, 548 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Okla. 1976).
169. Flick & Replansky, supra note 149, at 435.
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C. Disclosure by the Lender
While there are circumstances which limit the disclosure
of material facts, 170 the lender generally has a duty to disclose
any fact which a prudent and reasonable banker would consider material.1 7 1 Once the lender determines that disclosure
is required, it must provide truthful and accurate information. 171 Such disclosure also minimizes the possibility
that the
73
disclosure.
lender's
the
misinterpret
will
borrower
Because many borrowers place a great deal of trust and
confidence in their lender, 174 it is very important that the
lender continually counsel the borrower throughout the duration of the lending relationship. 175 While courts have recognized oral modifications to a written agreement between
170. See Nicewander, supra note 53, at 621-22.
171. See, e.g., Everman Nat'l v. United States, 756 F.2d 865, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(applied the standard of whether a prudent and reasonable banker would have reason to
know that FMHA would regard as important the fact that House's refusal to disclose
constituted a bar to his selling Grade A milk); Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal
Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405, 1408-09 (6th Cir. 1984) (in which a bank officer undertook
to provide information to purchaser regarding creditworthiness of a bank customer
knowing that the purchaser had confidence in officer's knowledge about the customer,
the officer had a duty to disclose facts about its customer's financial instability); Camp
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 12 Ark. App. 150, -, 671 S.W.2d 213, 216 (1984) (a residential lender had a duty to disclose to home buyer, where buyer was unknowledgeable as
to flood prone areas and reasonably relied on the lender's representations).
172. See, e.g., Central States Stamping, 727 F.2d at 1409; Catalina Yachts v. Old
Colony Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (D. Mass. 1980); Rigby Corp. v.
Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). See also
ROBERT MORRIS ASSOCIATES, CODE OF ETHICS (1980), Articles 1 & 3, which state in
part:
Article 1:
There are two cardinal principles in the exchange of credit information: confidentiality and accuracy of inquiries and replies ....
Article 3:
Responses should ... disclose sufficient material facts commensurate with the
purpose and amount of the inquiry. Specific questions should be given careful
and frank replies.
Id.
173. See, e.g., Central States Stamping, 727 F.2d at 1409; Catalina Yachts, 497 F.
Supp. at 1236; Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 540.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
175. See Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Mun. Leasing, 716 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983)
(suggests that the duty of disclosure extends to the negotiation stage). See also In re
Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228, 232 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986); Klein v. First
Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, -, 196 N.W.2d 619, 622-23 (1972).
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parties,1 76 it is always best to have the entire agreement between the parties in writing. 17 7 In addition, lenders should
maintain complete and accurate files of every material event
that occurs during the course of the lending relationship.
Since any document, memo, or letter written by the lender
may ultimately be seen by a jury, only the facts, and not subjective comments about the borrower, should be recorded. 178
This is one of the best ways for the lender to avoid claims by
malice, insensitivity or arrothe borrower that it acted with
79
gance toward the borrower.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the adoption in Wisconsin of any of the previously
analyzed common law lender liability theories, could Metropolitan Bank be found liable for putting Plastic Plus in default
and accelerating payment?' 80 This analysis reveals that
Plastic Plus and Danny Ongais would most likely have a
cause of action based on the lender liability theory of good
faith and fair dealing.' 8' Such facts as an understandably
slight decrease in the current ratio which does not jeopardize
Metropolitan Bank's position, and the calling of the loan
solely for the commercial advantage of Metropolitan Bank
may be sufficient to indicate that Metropolitan Bank failed to
act in good faith. While counsel probably is safe in informing
Metropolitan Bank that it has not exercised control sufficient
for courts to imply agency,112 nor made the threats or repre176. See, e.g., National Bank of Alaska v. J.B.L. & K., Inc., 546 P.2d 579, 586-87
(Alaska 1976).
177. SterlingFaucetCo., 716 F.2d at 543-44 (the detailed content of a commitment
letter enabled the court to discern the intent of the parties); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco,
674 P.2d 288, 292 (Alaska 1983) (the written security agreement allowed the court to
distinguish between what were "mere negotiations" and what was actually included in

the contract).
178. Cappello, supra note 141, at 7; Moss, supra note 165, at 72. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 1981) (the lender's internal

memo, which stated, "[this organization [Warren] needs very strong paternal guidance," evidenced excessive control by the lender).
179. Cappello, supra note 141, at 7. See Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 1983).
180. See generally the Introduction to this Comment, which contains a factual description for this hypothetical situation.
181. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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sentations needed to bring about the application of the theories of fraudulent misrepresentation, 8 3 duress,184 tortious
interference with business relations185 or negligent misrepresentation,1 86 it can be argued that Metropolitan Bank committed a breach of fiduciary duty.1 87 The fact that Danny is

unsophisticated in financial matters, has had a longstanding
relationship with Metropolitan Bank and has acted to expand
its business because of Metropolitan Bank's advice, indicates
that a fiduciary relationship exists. Therefore, a court could
hold that Metropolitan Bank had a duty to inform Plastic
Plus that the act of borrowing $800,000 or more without increasing its current asset base would result in a less than acceptable current ratio and constitute an event of default.
Whether Wisconsin courts will adopt any of the common
law lender liability theories is yet to be seen. What is readily
apparent, though, is that juries willingly side with the borrower.' Perhaps the best advice to the lender is: beware, the
advent of lender liability has given borrowers the wherewithal to demand that they be treated fairly throughout the
course of the lending relationship.
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